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This document was submitted to UNCITRAL Working Group III on ISDS reform in accordance with
paragraph 83 of document A/CN.9/970 (Report of Working Group III (Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Reform) on the work of its 37th session (New York, 1-5 April 2019)). That paragraph, and the discussion it
reflects, invited submissions by states and other stakeholders on reform options so as to inform UNCITRAL’s
efforts identifying and prioritizing particular solutions UNCITRAL will develop in the next phase of its work.
The text was drafted by Brooke Güven (CCSI) and Lise Johnson (CCSI), with helpful input from Lorenzo
Cotula (IIED), Thierry Berger (IIED) and Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder (IISD).

Context and summary
Governments across the globe have acknowledged broad concerns with investment treaties, in
particular older-generation agreements. In the context of UNCITRAL’s Working Group III (WGIII),
states and other stakeholders have jointly identified certain fundamental concerns with one of the
most challenging elements incorporated in investment treaties: investor–state dispute settlement
(ISDS). One option for governments to address these concerns and limit their risks under investment
treaties is to identify those treaties deemed problematic and agree with partners to terminate them.
Another option is for state parties to agree to suspend the application of ISDS by explicitly
withdrawing consent to arbitration. Unilateral and consensual terminations at the bilateral level are
already on the rise and have outpaced the number of new treaties signed in recent years.
However, termination and/or withdrawal of consent from ISDS at the multilateral level could be a
simpler and more systemic way to address and manage the concerns of states in relation to their
outdated stock of investment treaties and concerns about ISDS. In light of the concerns identified in
WGIII, this multilateral approach should be among the solutions for states to consider independently
or in conjunction with other solutions.
The need to consider these options arises from issues of both timing and effectiveness: Any reform
option designed to address procedural mechanisms that would apply to existing treaties (including a
multilateral court, which requires a convention establishing such a court to be drafted, with
subsequent signature and ratification) will likely take years to come into force. If and when it does
come into force, its effectiveness may be limited because (1) major capital-exporting states may not
ratify any implementing convention and (2) investors will likely retain the ability to “treaty shop”
around any such convention by routing investments through states not party to any new instrument.
These issues make it crucial to explore nearer-term and more systemic solutions in order to solve
concerns about existing treaties, even alongside longer-term processes.
In addition to issues of timing and effectiveness, considering multilateral termination and withdrawal
of consent can also offer interested states a set of options that more holistically respond to
fundamental issues and concerns regarding the overall costs and benefits of the present international
investment agreement (IIA)–ISDS system and its asymmetrical nature.2 UNCITRAL’s WGIII is
limiting its assessment to procedural, and not substantive, concerns about ISDS, and, as a result,
solutions suggested in this context will address procedural, and not substantive, issues. Therefore, in
light of the broader range of issues that are central to many of the calls for reform of the IIA–ISDS
system, several of the solutions suggested in connection with WGIII to date seek relatively minor
changes (e.g., proposing codes of conduct for arbitrators or guidance for more efficient case
management). Many broader concerns about the IIA–ISDS system stem from the extensive legal
privileges that ISDS affords mobile capital and the negative impacts that those legal privileges can
have on the economic development objectives of states, as well as the rights and interests of different
stakeholders within those states. It is thus important to recognize termination and withdrawal of
consent to ISDS as legitimate and rational options for states seeking to reduce their concerns about
outsized costs and risks of the current IIA–ISDS system while ongoing discussions of new procedural
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mechanisms continue. Concrete strategies for governments to integrate multilateral termination and
withdrawal of consent in the reform agenda can help provide space to address and respond to these
issues and can enable states to more clearly focus their attention on crafting international investment
instruments better designed to catalyze and govern investment for sustainable development.
The draft text below illustrates one way this can be done. Modelled after the EU’s initiative to
terminate intra-EU bilateral investment treaties and the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax
Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), a legal instrument
based on the text below would enable states to efficiently and legally (1) secure international
termination of existing IIAs or (2) amend existing IIAs so as to restrict access to ISDS (while leaving
underlying treaty obligations and the possibility of state-to-state dispute settlement in place). States
could also use this approach to limit ISDS to certain causes of action, amending IIAs to retain consent
to ISDS for some claims (e.g., direct expropriation after exhaustion of domestic remedies) while
eliminating it for others (e.g., fair and equitable treatment).3
The text below provides for two opt-in solutions that states could select on a treaty-by-treaty, opt-in
list basis. Similar to the matching mechanism contained in the BEPS treaty, to the extent treaty
counterparties each select either termination (Option A) or withdrawal of consent to arbitrate (Option
B) to apply to a specific treaty (or treaties), such matching outcome would apply to the designated
treaty/ies. To the extent one treaty party designates a specific treaty for withdrawal of consent (Option
B) and its treaty counterparty designates such treaty for termination (Option A), withdrawal of
consent (Option B) will be the default option for such treaty. Further opt-in options could be added
into this template if desired by its parties. Parties could also include language in this treaty to provide
for unilateral declarations with respect to covered investment treaties (with respect to either Option A
or Option B) if a treaty counterparty does not designate such treaty or become a party to this
instrument.
Withdrawal of consent and termination can be used to achieve near-term solutions to the widely
recognized and relatively intractable problems of the current IIA–ISDS system. While states, in
parallel, explore medium- and long-term solutions in ongoing IIA and ISDS reform processes, this
mechanism could complement those ongoing efforts. States could choose to ultimately reinstate some
form of ISDS if and when a new instrument on multilateral reform is agreed, while protecting
themselves (and their taxpayers) from ISDS cases as negotiations on such an instrument are
proceeding. States could also choose to move forward after termination and/or withdrawal of consent
and pursue other strategies for attraction and governance of investment.
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This follows the approach taken in the recent renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement,
which, for most investors and investments, limits ISDS to claims of direct expropriation, national treatment and
the most-favoured nation treatment obligation after exhaustion. Flexibility to decide whether and how to amend
treaties to limit access to ISDS for certain types of claims could be achieved through an approach such as that
proposed by Colombia in its submission to the WGIII, 14 June 2019, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.173.
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Treaty Withdrawing Consent to Arbitrate and Terminating Bilateral
Investment Treaties
THE CONTRACTING PARTIES,
RECOGNIZING the necessity of designing and implementing appropriate investment policies,
including transparent and fair investment dispute settlement regimes, to maximize the potential of
cross-border investments to contribute to sustainable development within and across countries;
CONSIDERING that investment treaties commonly contain provisions under which an investor from
one state may, in the event of a dispute concerning investments in another state, bring proceedings
(ISDS proceedings) against the latter state before an arbitral tribunal;
MINDFUL that governments have identified a wide range of concerns arising from such ISDS
proceedings;
RECOGNIZING that efforts are underway at domestic and international levels to craft effective
solutions to address such concerns;
CONSIDERING that the development of such solutions may be a lengthy process and that there is
uncertainty regarding the content, scope, implementation and ultimate effectiveness of such solutions;
and
CONSCIOUS of the challenges that may arise by requiring states to bilaterally renegotiate existing
bilateral or plurilateral investment treaties to implement reforms;
WHEREAS:
(1) Each Contracting Party has made, or may make, a notification pursuant to the terms of Article [__]
[Notifications] listing certain investment treaties to which it is a party (each a “Covered Investment
Treaty”);
(2) Each Covered Investment Treaty may contain notice periods or other conditions for amendment,
modification or termination of the treaties;
(3) Each Covered Investment Treaty may provide that investor–state arbitration is available for a
certain period after denunciation or termination of the bilateral investment treaty (each such clause a
“survival clause”);
(4) Investor–state arbitration clauses exist in each Covered Investment Treaty;
(5) The commitments to offer to arbitrate, or to arbitrate, are commitments between the state parties to
each Covered Investment Treaty, and do not create rights held by foreign investors;
(6) Due to concerns about the conduct of ISDS proceedings under investment treaties, the Contracting
Parties desire to address their concerns by formally withdrawing their consent to those proceedings
with respect to certain Covered Investment Treaties, or terminating in their entirety certain Covered
Investment Treaties, or taking such actions in the future.
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(7) Each Contracting Party has made, or may make, a notification pursuant to the terms of Article 1
[Application of Withdrawal of Consent or Termination Provisions] designating each Covered
Investment Agreement as an Option A Treaty or Option B Treaty.
(8) Investors from a Contracting Party that have initiated investor–state arbitration prior to the entry
into force of this Treaty or its application to a Covered Investment Treaty, and where the outcome of
such arbitration is still pending, may have decided not to pursue a parallel action before the competent
domestic court, either due to a provision in the bilateral investment treaty prohibiting such parallel
action or for reasons of opportunity. As a result, domestic actions based on national law may now be
time-barred. For reasons of equity, the Contracting Parties consider it appropriate to stipulate in their
national legal orders that such investors may still bring actions in national courts, even where they
would otherwise be time-barred but would not have been on the date the ISDS proceeding was
initiated, within six months from the entry into force of the present Treaty, provided that they
formally withdraw their arbitration claim by the time they bring such an action;
RECOGNIZING the need for an effective mechanism to amend and terminate existing treaties in a
synchronized and efficient manner across the network of Covered Investment Treaties without the
need to bilaterally renegotiate each such Covered Investment Treaty;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
ARTICLE 1 – Application of Withdrawal of Consent or Termination Provisions
1. Option A (Termination) – Each Contracting Party may choose to apply all provisions of this
Treaty to any or each of its Covered Investment Treaties in a notification pursuant to Article 7
[Notifications]. For Contracting Parties selecting Option A for certain Covered Investment Treaties
(each an “Option A Treaty”), Article 5 [Termination of bilateral investment treaties] of this Treaty
shall only apply between or among Contracting Parties with respect to their Option A Treaties. All
other provisions of this Treaty shall apply between and among all Contracting Parties’ Covered
Investment Treaties, as applicable.
2. Option B (Withdrawal of Consent) – Each Contracting Party may choose to apply all provisions
of this Treaty other than Article 5 [Termination of bilateral investment treaties] to any or each of its
Covered Investment Treaties in a notification pursuant to Article 7 [Notifications]. For Contracting
Parties selecting Option B for certain Covered Investment Treaties (each an “Option B Treaty”),
Article 5 [Termination of bilateral investment treaties] shall not have any force or effect with respect
to such Option B Treaties. All other provisions of this Treaty shall apply between and among all
Contracting Parties with respect to their Covered Investment Treaties, as applicable.
3. Each Covered Investment Treaty must be designated as either an Option A Treaty or an Option B
Treaty pursuant to the terms of Article [__] [Entry into Force and Effectiveness].
4. Each Contracting Party may at any time expand its selection of Covered Investment Treaties, and
shall designate each additional Covered Investment Treaty as an Option A Treaty or as an Option B
Treaty, through a notification pursuant to Article 7 [Notifications].
5. With respect to Covered Investment Treaties that have been designated as Option B Treaties, each
Contracting Party may at any time change the designation of such Covered Investment Treaty to an
Option A Treaty through a notification pursuant to Article 7 [Notifications].
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ARTICLE 2 – Waiver of Notice Periods or Other Conditions for Amendment, Modification or
Termination
The Contracting Parties hereby waive each and every provision of each Covered Investment Treaty
requiring a notice period or other condition precedent to the effectiveness of an amendment,
modification or termination of each such treaty, other than conditions of mutual ratification, approval
or acceptance.
ARTICLE 3 – Amendment of Survival Clauses
Each Covered Investment Treaty is hereby amended to eliminate each and every survival clause
contained therein.4
ARTICLE 4 – Withdrawal of Consent to Arbitrate
1. Each signatory to this Treaty hereby withdraws its consent to investor–state arbitration contained in
and under each Covered Investment Treaty.
2. Each signatory to this Treaty hereby waives its rights to challenge other signatories’ decisions to
withdraw consent to investor–state arbitration contained in and under each Covered Investment Treaty
as a breach of that investment treaty.
3. For greater legal certainty, each Covered Investment Treaty is hereby amended to eliminate each
Contracting Party’s consent to investor–state arbitration contained therein.
4. The withdrawal of such consent is without prejudice to each Contracting Party’s ability to consent
to investor–state arbitration on a case-by-case basis for each Covered Investment Treaty that has not
been terminated pursuant to Article 5.
ARTICLE 5 – Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties
Each Option A Treaty is hereby terminated and has no further legal effect.
ARTICLE 6 – Grace Period for Bringing Actions before National Courts
1. An investor who has filed a claim for arbitration whose arbitration proceeding is based on a
Covered Investment Treaty and was pending on the date of Entry into Force of this Treaty pursuant to
Article [__] (or the addition of the relevant Covered Investment Agreement pursuant to Article 2 and
Article [__] hereof, whichever is later in time) may still bring an action in the competent national
court, even where it would otherwise be time-barred but would not have been on the date the
investor–state arbitration was initiated, within six months from the date of application of this Treaty in

4

For various reasons (such as political acceptance of termination or withdrawal of consent), states may wish to
retain rights conferred on covered investors under the survival clauses in their treaties and thus may not desire to
terminate the survival clause immediately. Parties may alternatively wish to retain but significantly shorten the
survival clause. If so, Article 3 should be removed or altered to indicate the desired amendment to the survival
clause and, if relevant, related elements of the treaty language altered throughout.
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respect of the relevant Covered Investment Treaty, provided that the investor withdraws its arbitration
claim by the time it brings such an action.
2. Those actions brought in national court pursuant to Article 6(1) shall be limited to the subject
matter covered by the arbitration proceedings.
3. Those actions shall be directed against the competent authorities of the responding Contracting
Party.
ARTICLE 7 – Notifications
1. All notifications made pursuant to this Treaty shall be made to the Depositary pursuant to the
instructions contained in Article [__] [Depositary].
2. All notifications relating to a Covered Investment Treaty or designating a treaty as such must
include a description of the treaty, along with any amending or accompanying instruments thereto;
each identified by title, names of the parties, date of signature and, if applicable at the time of the
notification, date of entry into force.
3. If notifications are made at the time of signature, they shall be confirmed upon deposit of the
instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, unless the document containing the notifications
explicitly states that it is to be considered definitive.
4. If notifications are not made at the time of signature, a provisional list of expected notifications
may be provided at that time.
ARTICLE [__] – Reservations
ARTICLE [__] – Interpretation and Implementation
ARTICLE [__] – Amendment
ARTICLE [__] – Signature and Ratification, Acceptance or Approval
1. As of [_______________], this Treaty shall be open for signature by all states.
2. This Treaty is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval.
3. The term “Contracting Party” means a state for which this Treaty is in force pursuant to Article [__]
[Entry into Force and Effectiveness].
4. The term “Signatory” means a state that has signed this Treaty but for which the Treaty is not yet in
force.
ARTICLE [__] – Entry into Force and Effectiveness
1. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date when instruments of ratification, approval or
acceptance have been deposited by two signatories. The instruments of ratification, approval or
acceptance shall be deposited with the Depositary.
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2. For each signatory that thereafter deposits its instrument of ratification, approval or acceptance, this
Treaty shall apply from the day following the date of deposit.
3. The entry into force and application of this Treaty to any Contracting Party does not require the
designation of any Covered Investment Treaty.
4. The provisions of this Treaty shall have effect with respect to each Contracting Party with respect
to a Covered Investment Treaty from the latest of dates on which this Treaty enters into force for each
of the Contracting Parties to the Covered Investment Treaty, if so designated.
5. For a new Covered Investment Treaty resulting from notification pursuant to Article 2(4) or a
redesignation of an Option B Treaty to an Option A Treaty pursuant to Article 2(5), the provisions of
this Treaty shall have effect with respect to each Contracting Party with respect to a Covered
Investment Treaty one month from the date the Depositary receives the notification required pursuant
to the respective article.
6. Without prejudice to the effectiveness of each other provision of this Treaty, for each Option A
Treaty, Article [__] [Waiver of Notice Periods or Other Conditions for Amendment, Modification, or
Termination] shall be deemed to have entered into force immediately prior to Article [__]
[Amendment of Survival Clauses], which shall be deemed to have entered into force immediately prior
to Article [__] [Withdrawal of Consent to Arbitrate], which shall be deemed to have entered into force
immediately prior to Article [__] [Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties].
7. Without prejudice to the effectiveness of each other provision of this Treaty (other than Article [__]
[Termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties], which has no force or effect for such treaties), for each
Option B Treaty, while all provisions shall be simultaneously effective, Article [__] [Waiver of Notice
Periods or Other Conditions for Amendment, Modification, or Termination] shall be deemed to have
entered into force immediately prior to Article [__] [Amendment of Survival Clauses], which shall be
deemed to have entered into force immediately prior to Article [__] [Withdrawal of Consent to
Arbitrate].
ARTICLE [__] – Depositary
1. [___________________] shall be the Depositary of this Treaty.
2. The Depositary shall notify the Contracting Parties and Signatories within [one calendar month] of:
a. Any signature pursuant to Article [__] [Signature and Ratification, Acceptance or Approval];
b. The deposit of any instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval pursuant to Article [__]
[Signature and Ratification, Acceptance or Approval];
c. Any notifications pursuant to Article [__] [Notifications];
d. Any proposed amendment to this Treaty pursuant to Article [__] [Amendments];
e. Any other communication related to this Treaty.
3. The Depositary shall maintain publicly available lists of:
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a. Covered Investment Treaties (including designations of Option A Treaty or Option B
Treaty); and
b. Notifications made by the Contracting Parties.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Treaty.
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